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Abstract  
of 
A REGIME SHIFT MODEL OF THE RECENT HOUSING BUBBLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
It has been widely assumed that there was a bubble in the U.S. housing market after1999. 
This paper analyzes the extent to which that was true. We define a bubble as: (1) a regime 
shift that is characterized by a change in the properties of deviations from the 
fundamentals of house price growth, and (2) where a shock to the fundamental equation is 
more self sustaining and volatile than in other periods. We model the fundamentals of 
price growth as a lagged adjustment of prices to the expected present value of future rent. 
We then study the autoregressive behavior of the residuals thus generated. We look at 
changes in momentum (the extent to which a shock to house price growth leads to further 
increases in house price growth) of the residuals. Our results from 44 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas for the period of 1980-2005 (quarterly data) are mixed. There is 
evidence of momentum in house price growth throughout the period, and momentum did 
increase after 1999, indicating a regime shift; but by a modest amount, and while 
momentum was sometimes strong it was not explosive. The regime shift was less 
apparent in the likely bubble candidate cities along the coasts, which had shown high 
growth in the past. The evidence on volatility is strong. In general, volatility did not 
increase in the nonbubble MSAs, and it decreased in the faster-growing bubble MSAs.  
 
 2
I. Introduction 
The recent property market in the United States has been widely perceived as having a 
bubble. Figure one shows the rate of growth of house prices across nine census regions 
(not labeled in the figure) from 1975 through 2005. The figure clearly shows that house 
prices tend to move together, although there are periods of large dispersion across 
regions. The proposed bubble period is post 1999. What makes this period different is the 
sharp acceleration in prices, especially in some regions and especially relative to inflation 
(not shown in the figure), during a period of relatively stable growth and little change in 
economic conditions. In earlier periods, the rapid house price change could plausibly be 
explained by changes in interest rates (for example, the early 1980s) or on regional 
recessions or expansions (such as the ups and downs of oil prices). These do not appear to 
be especially strong candidates for explanation in the late 1990s and after.  
 
A few factors might show explanatory power on the property price movement. Figure two 
shows national rates of growth of house prices, the ten-year Treasuries, an index of 
imputed homeowner rents, and the Consumer Price Index (all of which are we use to 
explain housing fundamentals in the later part of the paper). In general, property prices 
move in step with the other series in Figure two. However, the acceleration in house 
prices after 1999 does not appear to be consistent with the other data. Although interest 
rate declines could be a factor (Long-term Treasuries dropped by 300 basis points, and 
real rates fell by close to the same amount), they cannot explain the regional variation in 
Figure One. Hence, a first glance at the data suggests that something unusual occurred in 
U.S. markets after 1999, and especially after 2003 
 
This paper analyzes the post 1999 behavior of house price growth in the U.S. In 
particular, we look at the extent to which we can characterize the period as having a 
 3
“bubble” relative to the “fundamentals” of price growth. The definition of a bubble is 
often vague and not widely agreed on. Our notion of a bubble is that it is: (1) a regime 
shift that is characterized by a change in the properties of deviations from the 
fundamentals of house price growth, and (2) where a shock to the fundamental equation is 
more self sustaining (increased momentum) and volatile than in other periods. The 
fundamentals of price growth come from lagged responses to the present value of 
expected future rent. 
 
Various methods have been proposed for testing bubbles in financial markets. Early work 
relied on econometric models such as variance-bound tests. However, these methods, 
which compare the actual data with fundamentals, have been criticized because of the 
specification errors of the fundamentals. Since then, tests for stationarity and 
cointegration as tests for absence of speculative bubbles have been proposed (see, for 
example, Diba and Grossman (1988) and Hamilton and Whiteman (1985)). Evans (1991), 
however, shows that these methods tend to reject the presence of the bubbles too often 
even if they are artificially induced in the Monte Carlo simulations. The literature of 
testing bubbles then moved on to the introduction of the more effective regime switching 
models first presented by Blanchard and Watson (1982). These models look at bubbles as 
changes in regime, and then analyze properties of price processes in out of the bubble 
regimes.1 Our model is a variant of regime shift models.  
 
Apart from Roche (2001), who studies the Dublin market from 1976 to 1999, regime 
switching models have not been widely applied in real estate research in explaining house 
                                                          
1 In a recent study, Baddeley (2005) incorporates destabilizing effects from bubbles, herding, and frenzies 
in the study of regime shifts conditional on institutional and political changes. She argues that in a less 
informed market such as real estate, thence where herding can be serious, and where financing and 
uncertainty are crucial factors in determining the time to invest, market booms and busts tend to be more 
pronounced.  
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price bubbles. We postulate two types of regimes: the first is “pre bubble,” which we 
assume takes up most of our sample period (1980-1999) and which is characterized by a 
process for house prices that we describe as coming from the “fundamentals” of the 
market in a manner loosely consistent with price being determined by expected present 
value of rents, and the second is the “bubble candidate” period of 2000-2005. The 
structure of our model is similar to papers on housing bubbles by Black et al. (2006), 
Chan et al. (2001) and Hwang et al. (2006).  
 
We first develop a model of the fundamentals of house price growth from panel data on 
rents (rental equivalent for owner-occupied housing), interest rates and house prices 
across 44 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the U.S. We then use the model, and 
variations, as a benchmark from which to generate residuals. Assuming the residuals 
follow an autoregressive process, we test whether a bubble exists, and if so, its 
magnitude, by studying how the residual processes change after 1999. In particular, we 
look at the extent to which momentum in the process (measured by the sum of the 
coefficients of the process) increases after 1999, and whether the volatility of the error 
terms in the residual process increases. We do this for two sets of panel data: one for slow 
growth or “nonbubble” MSAs, largely cities in the center of the country, which are 
defined as MSAs whose house prices grew on average less than 2% per year faster than 
rent; and the other for a set of “bubble candidate” MSAs, largely coastal cities, whose 
prices grew more than 2% faster than rent (see Appendix 1).2  
 
We find evidence of momentum throughout the period and some evidence that 
momentum increased after 1999, but not by a lot. We find no evidence of an increase in 
volatility. We also do not find evidence of explosive momentum (sum of coefficients 
                                                          
2 The long run trend in our model is for prices to grow at about a 2% per year faster rate than rents.  
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greater than one) after 1999, nor do we find much difference in price growth behavior 
between the bubble and non bubble candidate cities. We do find that momentum operates 
with a long lag. There were always bubbles, but not a large regime shift, at least not in our 
sample period. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a discussion on bubbles and 
regime switching models that have been widely applied in financial markets. Section III 
discusses how the housing price growth can be modeled. In particular, we suggest the 
fundamental equation from which bubbles in the market can be tested. Section IV 
describes the data employed, while Section V presents the results. Section VI discusses 
the robustness of our tests, and Section VII concludes the study. 
 
II. Bubbles and Regime Switching 
There has been considerable research on modeling the price movements of stock markets 
in the desire of capturing the deviations from the fundamental values. 3  Two versions of 
these models are the fads model proposed by Summers (1986) and the stochastic bubbles 
model suggested by Blanchard and Watson (1982). The latter type was subsequently 
extended by Van Norden and Schaller (1993, 1996), and Van Norden, (1996), who use 
switching regressions to describe the time-varying relationship between returns and 
deviations from the fundamentals.  
 
The Fads model 
Borrowing from Fama and French (1988) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), we 
can describe fads models as follows. The logarithm of market price of an asset is assumed 
                                                          
3 Other proposed sources of bubbles are, for example, overconfidence of speculators coming from two 
different groups such that the deviations in price expectations create trading (Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003)), and money illusion as a result of reduction in inflation, and hence nominal mortgage costs 
(Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006)). 
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to be divided into (1) a non-stationary part that describes the fundamental price and (2) a 
stationary component that implies the returns are predictable (from previous returns). 
Both components are autoregressive and subject to different white noises with their own 
distributions. Given a proxy of the fundamental price because of measurement error, all 
these imply 
(1)  ( ) ttxttt epppp +−+=−+ 101 ββ  
where pxt is the available proxy of the fundamental price, and ( )2,0~ ωσiidet . This 
regression equation gives the excess returns as a function of differences between the log 
of the proxy for the fundamental and the log the observed price. In financial markets, 
one commonly used proxy is the dividend, and the explanatory variable in the equation 
is the lagged log dividend/price ratio. Hence, price growth is a function of current price 
and lagged fundamentals. Furthermore, because current price (via equation (1)) depends 
on the dividend/price ratio lagged again, iterating equation (1) implies that price 
appreciation depends on a long lagged function of the proxy for fundamentals.  
 
Applying this model to house prices requires some modification. First, the assumption 
that the fundamentals follow a random walk and that the fads part is stationary is not 
likely to hold. We expect that to be the case because of obvious inefficiencies in real 
estate markets: (1) transaction costs in real estate are high, (2) owner-occupiers are only 
in the market occasionally, and (3) the tax benefits accrued to homeowners reduce their 
costs but not costs for speculators, thus making arbitrage difficult. As a result, there is 
likely to be momentum even of fundamental prices all the time. Beyond that, we want to 
pose expectations as about changes in prices rather than levels, and model fundamentals 
applied to growth rates to see if residuals from this have different properties in the post 
1999 period. In other words, we do not impose the assumption that residuals from 
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equations like (1) are independently and identically distributed (iid).   
 
The Regime Switching Model 
When the regression error term, te , is heteroscedastic, the fads model can lead to 
regime-switching for stochastic bubbles (which are stochastic because they either 
survive or collapse, subject to some probabilities). The existence of two possible 
outcomes of the bubbles means that there are two regimes generating market returns, the 
bubble being the more volatile of the two. Tests are conducted on whether the two 
volatilities are significantly different. 
 
We extend the regime switching model by relaxing the assumption that the error term in 
the autoregressive fundamental price process is white noise. We can then arrive at an 
equation similar to equation (1), with longer lags, and we assume (and test) that the te  
follows an autoregressive process of the form 
(2) tjtjt
T
tt ee υω +∑= −−  . 
A regime shift to a bubble regime is characterized by an increase in the volatility of tυ  
and in the size of the coefficients of the process for te , which is measured by jt
T
t −∑ ω . 
 
III. Modeling House Price Growth 
 
In this section, we develop a model similar to that in equation (1) for the housing market, 
and adding different stochastic properties. The basis of the model is the intertemporal 
behavior of households that choose between housing, th , whose purchase price is tP  and 
a representative consumer good, tc  whose price is 
c
tP .  
 
The Basic Model 
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Consider a household that, given information set, tΩ , about the uncertain future house 
prices and interest rates maximizes an intertemporal utility function of the form  
(3)  ttt
T
t hcUE β),((Σ  
over some time horizon T, subject to the constraint that the present value of expenditure 
(cash flows) equal the present value of income plus initial wealth.  
 
It is straightforward to show that (see Dougherty and Van Order (1982) for a derivation of 
a nonstochastic version) a first order condition can be expressed as 
(4)  
( )
c
t
t
t
ttt
t
ct
ht
P
P
P
PPE
r
U
U
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ −Ω
−= +1 . 
where r is approximately given by απθ +−− i)1( , with θ being the tax rate, i the 
risk-free interest rate, π rental growth rate, and α  is a constant term. We can think of r as 
the “cap rate” for our representative property.  It captures other costs like depreciation 
and property taxes which might be assumed proportional to property value and, if we 
allow risk, a risk premium. A broader specification would take account of possible cash 
flow effects. That is, high nominal rates can have a cash-flow effect beyond the real rate 
effect in (4) because of limitations on the ability of borrowers against future income, 
especially during periods of inflation. In that case the implied coefficient on i would be 
greater than 1-θ. 
 
Equation (4) says that the marginal rate of substitution between housing and the other 
good equals the ratio of the implicit rent on housing,
( )
t
t
ttt
t PP
PPE
r ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ −Ω
− +1 , divided by 
the price of the other good. ( ctht UU / )
c
tP  can be defined as the household’s imputed rent. 
Equation (4) along with the other constraints and parameters can be used to generate the 
demand for housing. This can then be attached to a model of housing production to 
generate a model of house prices. Building in allowances for transactions and moving 
costs in r would imply adjustment to the marginal condition in equation (4) with a lag, 
and the model would be very complicated and probably sensitive to particular 
specifications..  
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An alternative to complicated model building is to take advantage of the fact that housing 
is rented as well as owned, and that we can assume that the owner acts as a landlord 
renting to him or her self. This implies a useful separation for modeling. In effect, rents 
summarize all of the local market conditions that are determined by income and wealth 
and supply elasticities, and we can take rent as given and express price as the present 
value of rent. This allows us to employ models like the price-dividend models used to 
analyze stock prices (the same rationale, and hence modeling approach, is also adopted by 
Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006)). 
 
Consider a household that is identical to the one that we have analyzed except that it rents 
at price Rt rather than owns. Because prices in this period are known, its first order 
condition corresponding to equation (4) is nonstochastic and is given by 
(5) cttctht PRUU // =  
For a household that is just indifferent between owning and renting4 we can equate 
expressions (4) and (5) to obtain a solution that 
(6) 
( )
t
ttt
t D
PER
P
Ω+
= +1  
where tt rD += 1 . The variable tr  incorporates a premium for risk for investing in real 
estate. Equation (6) says that price equals the current rent plus the sales price in the next 
period. This is a rational expectations (perfect foresight) model, and like most such 
models it is indeterminate. That is, there are many current levels of price that are 
consistent with equation (6). For example, consider the simplest case where rents and rt 
are constant and is equal to R and r. Then a solution to equation (6) is  
(7) 
r
RPt = . 
However, an infinity of initial levels of tP  can be chosen for which (solving equation (6) 
for 1+tP  ) the pricing equation 
(8) RDPP tt −=+1  
                                                          
4 Households that are approximately indifferent between owning and renting are likely to be in the lower 
tax brackets. Moreover, Cauley and Pavlov (2002) mention that models using rental costs provide a lower 
bound of the price because “pride of ownership” has not been priced. 
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still holds. While equation (7) reflects the Gordon model and provides a stable 
equilibrium price, equation (8) leads to explosive price moves because D is greater than 
one. In other words, equation (7) corresponds to what we think of as a fundamental 
solution, while equation (8) corresponds to an explosive bubble.  
 
More generally, equation (8) can be solved recursively to obtain 
(9) )/(lim)/( 11
0
t
i
itit
i
t
i
ititt DPEDREP Ω+Ω= ++++
∞
=
++∑ . 
The transversality condition is that the second term approaches zero, so that the 
fundamental equation becomes 
(10) ( )∑
∞
=
++ Ω=
0
/
i
t
i
ititt DREP . 
However, as before, this is not the only solution. A bubble process that satisfies 
(11)  tttt eDBB +=+1  
will also satisfy equation (6), and it will tend to be explosive.  
 
Special Cases 
Equation (15) is quite complicated because of covariances, such as those coming from 
stock-flow adjustments of rents and prices over time, among the variables in it. For 
instance, we should expect interest rates and future rents to be correlated on the grounds 
that a rise in interest rates will, given rents, lower property values, but on the other hand 
induce less production in the future, and thus higher rents. Indeed, if supply is perfectly 
elastic in the long run, a rise in interest rate will produce a gradual decline in rents with no 
long run price change.  
 
We consider first a very simple model with constant interest rates and a steady growth 
rate of expected rents. Then we can adapt the Gordon model  
(12)  )*/( απφ +−= iRP tt . 
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That is, r is extended to ( )απφ +− *i , where ( )φ  is a coefficient that incorporates both 
the tax and cash flow effects on the effect of i, the interest rate, and *π  is the expected 
rates of growth of rent. The model does not allow us to predict whether changes in i or 
*π  will have a larger effect on price. Notice that the model will always work better by 
including more exogenous variables such as level of supply or average personal income. 
However, if our model is correct, rent should be a summary statistic that has already 
accounted for supply and demand.  
 
Taking first differences and logarithms of expression (12), we have 
(13) ( )*ln πγπ −Δ−= iGP tt  
where tGP  is the growth rate of house prices and, tπ  is the current rate growth of rents. 
Equation (13) can be approximated by  
(14) *πββαπρ π Δ+Δ−=−= iGP ittt  
where tρ  is the rate of growth of house prices minus the rate of growth of rent and the βs 
are positive. This can for instance be estimated by assuming that *πΔ  is a function of 
past levels of πΔ . However, preliminary estimates of (14) do not work well; longer lags 
are necessary for the model to fit well and/or make sense. So we extend the lag structure. 
 
Adjustment to Equilibrium 
Equation (14) only holds in the simple Gordon Model, which involves two key 
assumptions: (1) the current price is the equilibrium price, and (2) rent growth is expected 
to be constant. 
 
The high transaction costs in housing markets make the first assumption difficult to take 
seriously. Moreover, ownership of single family housing in the U.S. is driven in many 
 12
ways by tax advantages5 that are received by property owners only on their first or 
second house, which precludes serious arbitrage. Home buyers tend to enter the market 
and obtain information about property only at times when they are seriously interested in 
buying. Hence, the information needed for equation (9) to hold is dispersed only 
gradually among different households. For these reasons, we expect prices to adjust with 
a lag to the equilibrium price. Furthermore, the second assumption about steady price 
growth is not likely to hold in the short run. Expected future rent growth is probably not 
constant and is probably correlated with interest rates and past growth in rents and prices. 
Theory does not tell us much about how to model these.  
 
To solve the problems discussed above, we impose the following structures on the 
fundamentals model. First, we model the formulation of expectations as composed of two 
parts: a short run part that reflects current information for the next few years, and a second 
longer run, “stabilized”, 6  part that looks like the Gordon Model, and to which 
expectations adjust after a period of time. That is, we assume that after some period the 
best that traders can do is to project steady growth. Before that, we allow rents to vary 
from the trend. Second, we assume that the present value formulation provides the 
equilibrium price, but that the market price only adjusts gradually to it by following a 
generalized geometrically distributed lag. The combination of these two structures 
implies that prices or the growth in prices adjust gradually to a long run Gordon model. 
 
Determining the Equilibrium Price 
                                                          
5 In particular, homeowners get to deduct much of the cost (e.g., mortgage interest and opportunity cost on 
equity) of operating the house (renting to themselves) and pay virtually no capital gains taxes without 
paying tax on the imputed rent (see Gyourko and Sinai, 2003, for the study of the impact of tax subsidies on 
home owners in various MSAs). 
6 This corresponds to the notion of a stabilized Cap Rate. 
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First we write the equilibrium price as the present value of an irregular rent stream for τ 
periods, followed by steady stream, or 
(15)      
( ) τ
τ
παγαγ +
+
= −++
+
++
= ∑ tt
t
tj
j
je
t i
rR
i
R
P
)1(1 *
. 
Alternatively, adding and subtracting 
( )∑
+
= −++
=
τ
παγ
t
tj
j
t
t
i
R
G
*1
, and dividing by tR , we 
have 
(16)  
r
G
riR
R
R
P
t
t
tj
j
t
t
t
e
t 11
)1(
+=+
++
= ∑
+
=
τ
αγ
δ
. 
 
We assume that actual price adjusts to the difference between current and equilibrium 
price, in logarithms. Let )/log( ttt RPp =  and )/log(
**
ttt RPp = . We extend the 
adjustment model in equation (1) to include possibly longer lags, that is,  
(17) ∑
=
−−+ −=−
T
j
jt
e
jtjtt pppp
0
1 )(λ . 
Taking first differences and rearranging, we have 
(18)  )/1/1()( 11
00
11 −−−−−−
==
−−−+ −+−+−=−= ∑∑ jtjtjtjt
T
j
j
T
j
jtjtjttt rrGGpppp θβρ . 
A linear approximation to this can be written as 
(19)  ∑
=
−−−−−−− +Δ+Δ+Δ−=
T
j
jtjt
G
jtjtjtjt
i
jtt Gi
0
** )( ρββπββαρ ρπ  
Both Δπ* and ΔG are expectations variables. We assume that they are taken from the 
current information set, which contains recent and past levels of interest rates, rents and 
prices. We can then rewrite equation (19) as  
(20) ∑
=
−−−−−− +Δ+Δ−=
T
j
jtjtjtjtjt
i
jtt i
0
)( ργπγγαρ ρπ , 
which says that the current rate of growth of house prices relative to rents is a linear 
function of past change in interest rates, rent growth, and lagged changes in price growth 
net of rent growth.  
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A less structured version of this is 
(21) )(
'
0
jtjtjt
i
jt
TT
t i −−−−
+
Δ+Δ−= ∑ πγγαρ π  
in which lagged tρ  is dropped, while the lag is lengthened by T’.  
 
Both versions impose the constraint that in the long run an increase in rent of 1% will 
increase house price growth by 1%. Hence, after T or T’ periods the model reverts to the 
Gordon model if α is zero. The presence of α allows rents and prices to have different 
trends. Reasons why this might be the case, primarily measurement error, are discussed 
below. 
 
Estimates of equations (20) and (21) will generate residuals, te . And instead of imposing 
te  as iid, we assume that it follows the autoregressive process 
(22)  t
T
tj
jtjtt ee υω += ∑
=
−−  
where tυ  is iid. The process for te  is a variant of the B process in expression (11). For a 
rational bubble, the sum of coefficients must be greater than one. Our tests are (1) of the 
amount of, and changes in, momentum as measured by whether jt
T
t −∑ ω  is greater than 
one and/or increased during the post 1999 period, and (2) whether the variance of tυ  was 
higher during the post 1999 period. 
 
 
IV. Data and Estimation 
Our measure of house price is the quarterly house price index released by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which provides the widely quoted 
residential (single-family) house price index for over 100 individual Metropolitan 
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Statistical Areas (MSAs) since 1980. The rent series is the “owner’s equivalent rent of 
primary residence” obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, from which we also 
acquire the local Consumer Price Indices. After matching these three series, data for a 
total of 44 MSAs can be used.7 We use the 10-year Treasury as a measure of nominal 
risk-free rate.8  
 
Three data concerns are in order. First, the price index may not hold quality constant. The 
OFHEO index looks at the same house twice but does not adjust for home improvement 
between observations, so it may over estimate growth in house prices. Second, measured 
rent may grow too slowly because of the agency cost of renting and measurement errors 
in the rental index. That is, even if we have matched prices and rents for owners 
indifferent between owning and renting, there is reason to believe that renters take less 
good care of property than do owners. Crone et al (2006) and Gordon and van Goethem, 
(2004) both discuss the extent to which the CPI rental index has underestimated rent 
growth over time (especially before 1985). If any of the above is the case, then there will 
be a tendency for our measure of P to grow faster than our measure of R (that is, for α to 
be positive), which is indeed what we find. Third, the price and rent series do not 
necessarily match up in the sense of the price series representing price growth for a 
household that is indifferent between owning and renting, probably a household in a 
relatively low tax bracket. We note here that the OFHEO index only covers prices of 
houses whose mortgages can be purchases by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. This imposes 
a limit, which is indexed to house prices over time and excludes approximately the top 
10% of the market (by number of loans). Hence, the price data do at least exclude those 
                                                          
7 In order to maximize the length of the time-series, we eliminate those MSAs that have short rent indices.  
 
8 We have tried to proxy the real interest rate by the ten year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). 
However, since the earliest available TIPs begins listing in 1997, we are not able to obtain a reliable real 
interest rate series. 
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owners who, say, for tax reasons, are the furthest from being indifferent between owning 
and renting. 
 
With these data, we first estimate variants of the fundamentals of price growth from the 
specifications of ρ in equations (20) or (21). We estimate fundamentals over the entire 
period. We vary these models by changing lag length. From these are generated residuals, 
which we model as given by equation (22) for various lag lengths. For each fundamental 
equation, we estimate four residual equations for a given lag length. These groups of 
regressions come from dividing the MSA sample into two groups: fast growing (bubble 
candidate) MSAs (those that are widely perceived as overheated markets, and mostly 
whose house prices over the period grew on average at a 2% per year faster rate than rents 
grew), and the rest as non bubble states. These bubble states are depicted with asterisks in 
Appendix 1. This grouping is meant to capture the possibility that the bubble candidates 
are more susceptible to bubbles. We also divide the sample into (1) the 1999 and earlier, 
pre bubble period, and (2) the post 1999 regime shift candidate period.  
 
Our tests are of the extent to which there was a regime shift. If there was a regime shift, 
we should expect the sum of the coefficients in estimates of equation (22) to be larger in 
the post 1999 period, perhaps larger in the bubble MSAs, and the variance of the residuals 
in the error regression to be higher post 1999, and perhaps higher in the bubble MSAs. 
 
V. Results 
Estimates of the Fundamentals 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the estimates of our two fundamental equations (20) and (21) 
respectively using the entire panel of data across MSAs for the entire sample period. The 
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variables in general have the right signs. The signs within groups are also consistent, 
generally negative for interest rate and positive for past rent growth and lagged ρ.  
 
Consider the 8-lag model in Table 1 (the third column). Long run effects are given by the 
sum of coefficients for the three variables. The sum of the interest rate coefficients is 
around -2.5, that of the rent growth is 2.3, while the sum of lagged ρ coefficients is 0.6 
(see Table 3). That the sum of coefficients of interest rate changes is close to, but slightly 
bigger than, the sum of the rent growth change coefficients is consistent with the notion 
that price is driven by real interest rates with the tax effect being more than offset by the 
cash flow effect. However, that result does hold for our other specification without 
lagged ρ .9 All versions of our models have constant terms of around 0.0025, reflecting a 
quarterly difference in growth rates of about 0.25%, or 1% per year. In the models 
without lagged ρ the constant term was around .5. The results suggest that in the long run 
prices grow at close to a 2% faster annual rate than rents.    
 
The long run effect of a change has to take into account feedback through the gradual 
adjustment of ρ . Long run equilibrium in growth rates takes place when past and current 
levels of ρ are the same. The cumulative effect of a one-time shock to i on ρ  after T 
periods is given (rounded) by 
(23)    ))()(
00
ργγρ ρ jt
T
i
jt
T
i −− ∑∑ +Δ= = -2.5Δi + 0 ρ6. . 
The data used in the model are all at quarterly rates, including the 10-year Treasuries. 
Hence a 100 basis points increase in 10-year Treasury rates is a 25 basis points increase in 
the quarterly rate. As a result, the long run effect of the 10-year Treasuries must be 
divided by four. Thus, a 100 basis points increase in interest rates will have a long run 
                                                          
9 For instance we might expect the sum of coefficients of lagged rent growth changes to be low because as 
proxies for future expectations they are subject to measurement error. 
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impact of -0.25 × 2.5 / (1 - 0.6), or about -1.6% on price relative to rent. The long run 
impact of a change in rates in the model is like duration. One might expect a somewhat 
bigger number for a long term asset. However, as was discussed above, it is likely that 
when interest rates change, expectations about future rents also change; in the usual stock 
flow model of housing adjustment, a decrease in interest rates will cause construction to 
increase, which will decrease future rents, lowering the numerator in the present value 
formula.  
 
The model with 4 lags does not fit well or make much sense. With 12 lags, the results are 
similar, although the fit is somewhat better. The sum of interest rate coefficients is about 
-1.7, the sum of rent growth 1.6, and the long run effect of an interest rate change is -1.3 
(see Table 3). In the 16 lag case, the model rejects the fixed effects. Nevertheless, we still 
obtain similar results. 
 
This appears to be a respectable model of fundamentals in the sense of having sensible 
coefficients. It also suggests that, because of the significantly positive coefficients for 
lagged ρ, there is momentum in house price growth over the entire period. A onetime 
shock to ρ feeds back into the model gradually and fades gradually. The strength of the 
momentum will also depend on the autoregressive properties of the errors in equation 
(22), which are analyzed below. The model implies a significant lag in the effect of an 
interest rate change on house prices. 
 
Table 2 has estimates of the fundamental equation without lagged ρ for 8, 12, and 16 
quarter lags. The lag lengths are longer than those in Table 1 because, by not including the 
lagged ρ, the effects captured by other explanatory variables should tend to be longer. It is 
obvious that not including the lagged dependent variable significantly reduces the 
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explanatory power of the fundamental equation. Stated differently, the “memory effect” 
previously shown by the lagged dependent variables to capture the momentum has to be 
shifted to other exogenous variables, thus requiring even longer history from these 
variables. Results are however in some ways similar. The sum of coefficients of interest 
rate change is -6.2, which gives about the same long run effect of interest rates on price. 
On the other hand, the effect of rent inflation is much less at 3.5. Shorter lag 
specifications produce worse fits, and the coefficients make less sense. 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the results of the coefficients for the various specifications 
of the fundamentals, as well the effects of a one time increase in the 10 Treasury rate, and 
adjusted R-squared. An obvious result is that longer lag specifications fit better, and their 
coefficients make more economic sense.10  
 
Error Equations 
We use the fundamental equation(s) to generate errors equations. In particular, we 
employ the 8-lag and 12-lag fundamental regression equations as depicted in Table 1 to 
generate residuals, which are then used to estimate variants of the autoregressive model 
as in equation (22). As described above, we divide the available data into bubble and 
nonbubble MSAs, and we produce separate estimates of the error model by these MSA 
divisions in the pre- and post-1999 period. The results using residuals from the 
fundamental equation with 8 lags and 12 lags are depicted respectively in Appendices 2 
and 3. Results for the same error equations for residuals from the 8-lag fundamental 
equation without lagged ρ (that is, regression results from Table 2) are shown in 
Appendix 4, while Appendix 5 depicts the corresponding findings for the 12-lag model. 
                                                          
10 We initially tried to establish the fundamental model with local CPI to capture the MSA specific 
inflation, and in a way, deduce the real interest rate. However, adding the variable does not increase the 
explanatory power and intuition of the model significantly. We therefore maintain the current model for 
parsimony. 
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Our concern is with the sum of the coefficients and the volatility of the disturbance. Table 
4 presents summary results for the sum of the coefficients by model and lag structure. 
Consider Panel B, which presents results for the model without lagged dependent 
variable, ρ. In all of the specifications, the sum of coefficients is positive before 1999; and 
in all cases the sum increased after 1999. On average, the increase in sums was around 0.2 
or 0.3. While the bubble MSAs had higher sums, the increase in sum was, if anything, 
lower in the bubble MSAs. Running across the table, it is easy to see that while the sums 
of the coefficients for the non-bubble MSAs show mixed patterns in both types of 
fundamental equations, those for the bubble MSAs almost ubiquitously (except for 
12-lagged error terms in the 12-lagged fundamental) decrease.  
 
A closer look at Appendices 2 to 5 reveals that the lagged errors of the bubble MSAs are 
significant mostly for only the first few lags; and this is especially true when more lags 
are included. The MSAs had faster, more front-loaded, adjustments in the post-bubble 
period. Something did happen post 1999. There was a regime shift, but not a large one. In 
fact, the regime shift tends to be smaller when longer lags are considered in the case of 
bubble MSAs. Furthermore, in none of the cases was the sum of coefficients close to one; 
tests on this were rejected in all cases. Momentum increased, but it was not explosive.  
 
Panel A produces results for cases with lagged ρ. It is more complicated because the 
presence of lagged ρ adds momentum to the system along with momentum added by the 
errors. In the pre-1999 period, the coefficient sums were generally negative, thus 
offsetting some of the positive momentum from the positive coefficients of lagged ρ. The 
results for before and after 1999 were similar; the sums tended to increase by around 0.3, 
though with more variability.  
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Summing up the basic results for the coefficients sum, we are able to observe momentum 
throughout the period, and the adjustment lags were long. There is also some evidence of 
a regime shift in the post-1999 period. However, unlike financial markets, there is no 
evidence of an explosive bubble associated with the regime shift. Finally, there is no 
evidence that the “bubble” MSAs were worse. Indeed, our model is able to explain the 
price movements in the bubble MSAs relatively better than the non-bubble ones. 
 
Volatility 
Table 5 presents results for testing the changes in the volatility of the errors in equation 
(22). Panel A corresponds to results generated from the fundamental with lagged 
regressand, ρ in Appendices 2 and 3; while Panel B presents results without lagged ρ from 
Appendices 4 and 5. We apply the Goldfield-Quandt test for the differences in variances. 
The results of the tests can be read from the “Pre/Post-1999 Test” rows. Bold face 
numbers show cases where the hypothesis that the variances are different is accepted. In 
the nonbubble MSAs the hypothesis is always rejected. In the bubble MSAs the 
hypothesis is almost always accepted. However, in all those case the variance fell after 
1999. Hence, once again, there is some evidence of a regime shift in the bubble MSAs. 
However, the shift is toward a more stable regime after 1999.11 
 
Reviewing the actual market movement may prompt a query on the choice of the cutoff 
period. That is, it is possible that the bubble became bigger in the later part of the 
post-bubble period. We therefore run error equations from the fundamentals in Appendix 
2 with 8 lags (results omitted here). In both periods of 2002 through 2005 and 2003 
                                                          
11 We have also tested the variances of the 44 individual MSAs. There is only an average of one or two 
MSAs that have statistically significant change in variance between to pre- and post-bubble periods in any 
of the cases. We therefore omit the results here for purpose of simplicity. 
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through 2005, the coefficient sums are either the same as those in the post-1999 period as 
a whole or, in the case of the bubble MSAs, lower. Table 6 depicts the variances in the 
various sub-periods. The rows noted as “GQ Test: 99 vs 02” and “GQ Test: 99 vs 03” 
exhibit tests for increases in variance. Variances did go up in both the post-1999 versus 
2002-2005 and post-1999 versus the 2003-2005 periods, but differences are not 
statistically significant. We can thus conclude that our results are not sensitive to the 
cutoff point at 1999. 
 
Fundamentals without Lagged Regressands 
As mentioned earlier, the fundamental equation without lagged dependent variable, ρ, 
requires longer lags because the effects captured by other explanatory variables should 
tend to be longer. We run the tests again with 20 lags and 24 lags on the explanatory 
variables. We then adopt the 12-lag error equation model. Results are shown in Appendix 
6. Panel A of the Table presents the panel regression results, while Panels B and C depict 
the regression results of the 12-lag error equation and the test of difference in variances 
between the pre and post bubble periods respectively.  
 
As expected, the explanatory power increases with increase in the number of lags 
included, albeit marginal. The error equation results also show that the MSAs price versus 
rent growth rates adjust relatively faster in the post-bubble period. As more lags are 
included in the fundamental, the errors tend to carry more momentum (sum of 
coefficients is bigger). Nevertheless, they are still non-explosive. Finally, only the bubble 
MSA group shows a change in the volatility from the pre versus post bubble period in the 
24-lag fundamental equation case; and is only barely statistically different. Once again, 
volatility in general decreases in the post-bubble period. 
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VI. Robustness of the Fundamentals 
A major complication in our study is that the results of the error equations might be 
sensitive to the fundamental equations employed. We therefore estimate some variations 
of the fundamentals to see if the error equations still lead to findings that are similar to the 
ones we obtained in the previous section. 
 
We first separate the data set for the fundamentals those for bubble MSAs and non-bubble 
MSAs and estimate separate panel regressions (regression results depicted in Appendix 
7). The rationale is that, assuming bubble and non-bubble markets are separate groups, 
intra-group markets might share identical effects from the factors in the fundamental 
equation, but not inter-group markets. As expected, the error equations (with 8, 12, and 
16 lags) shown in Appendix 8 are different between the two groups of MSAs, as well as 
different from the previous test without the separation, because the panel regressions 
should be able to better capture the common characteristics of the two MSA groups. The 
sensitivity to a change in the regression does not however alter our previous conclusion. 
First, the sums of the coefficients of the lagged errors are far less than one. Second, the 
volatilities in the pre- and post-bubble period are very similar (see Table 7). Even if the 
hypothesis that variances in the two periods are statistically the same is occasionally 
rejected, the difference is minimal. This is similar to the findings in the previous section.  
 
Our second variation is to include the inflation rate into the fundamental equation. This 
allows the discount rate to be thought of composed of a real rate plus real rent growth, and 
these might not have the same coefficients (e.g., because of different measurement 
errors). Furthermore, local inflation may contain information about rent, or its 
determinants that is not found in the rental equivalent index (e.g., the rent numbers might 
be too smooth or grow too slowly relative to the true numbers. We therefore obtained 
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changes in inflation rates for each individual MSA from the local CPI series available 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and included the series in the fundamental equation, 
again with 8 lags, from which we obtain the variance tests from the error equations.12 The 
error equation results are tabulated in Appendix 9, while the comparison of variances in 
the pre- and post-1999 period is exhibited Table 8. It is clear from the tables that, again, 
albeit the high sensitivity of the results to the fundamental equation, the basic result is still 
that there are only small traces of bubbles/regime shifts in the property market in the U.S. 
in the period of study.  
  
Another robustness check is to test if the behavior of the models differs when the 
pre-bubble period is separated from the post-bubble period in estimating the fundamental 
equation. However, the very short post-bubble period data does not have enough degrees 
of freedom for testing on the two periods separately. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Perhaps the best way to characterize housing markets during our sample period is that 
there were always small bubbles, but not a large regime shift. There does appear to have 
been a small regime shift after 1999, but it was weaker in the likely bubble candidate 
cities along the coasts, cities which had shown high growth throughout the period. There 
is evidence of momentum in house price growth throughout the period, and the 
momentum did increase after 1999, but not by a lot. These results appear to hold if we 
consider post-2002 as the bubble period. The evidence for volatility is strong. In general, 
volatility not only did not increase in the nonbubble MSAs, but actually decreased in the 
faster-growing bubble MSAs. Hence, evidence for a bubble across regions is modest, and 
                                                          
12 We do not present the panel regression results with local inflation because our focus is on the behavior of 
the residuals from the error equations thus generated. 
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somewhat mitigated by the long lags suggested by the model. Results are not very 
sensitive to the variations in lag length and lag structure that we tried.  
 
We have not tested for local results, so we cannot exclude strong local bubbles. We have 
also not ruled out that income (see Black et al.) might be a better proxy for rent than our 
current rent series extracted from the CPI. Asian immigrants mostly to coastal cities are 
another possible explanation for overheating the real estate market, but are unlikely to be 
a source of bubbles. It is for future extension and more complicated modeling to test 
effects of such immigrants, or other demographic patterns, as an explanation for why 
growth rates in bubble cities tend to be more sustainable.  
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Figure one
Annual Growth Rates of House Prices by 9 
Census Regions
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Figure Two  Growth Rates of House Price Index, Ten-year Treasury Bonds, 
Consumer Price Index, and Rent Index, at the National Level 
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Table 1  Basic Regression Results for the Fundamental Equation with Lagged 
Regressands (Various Lags) 
Equation being Difference between Growth Rates of House Prices versus Rent 
(Regressand) on Lagged Changes in 10-year Treasury, Local Rent Growth, and 
Regressands (MSA Fixed Effects Omitted)     
   Variables 4 Lags 8 Lags 12 Lags 
Nominal Interest 
   
Lag 1 0.2436 -0.1920 -0.0360 
2 -0.5360 ** -0.5320 ** -0.3400 
3 -0.1040 -0.3720 * -0.1120 
4 -0.2120 -0.0160 0.1752 
5  -0.0004 -0.0360 
6  -0.6960 *** -0.4360 ** 
7  0.1600 -0.0600 
8  -0.8240 *** -0.7960 *** 
9  -0.0360 
10  -0.0600 
11  0.0908 
12  -0.0360 
Rent Growth   
Lag 1 -0.0323 0.1352 *** 0.2117 *** 
2 -0.1234 ** 0.1661 *** 0.2849 *** 
3 -0.0265 0.2388 *** 0.3677 *** 
4 0.0935 *** 0.4309 *** 0.3734 *** 
5  0.3892 *** 0.3161 *** 
6  0.4337 *** 0.2982 *** 
7  0.4076 *** 0.2403 *** 
8  0.0705 ** -0.1196 ** 
9  -0.1500 *** 
10  -0.1495 *** 
11  -0.0921 ** 
12  0.0376 
Regressand   
Lag 1 -0.1255 *** 0.0257 * 0.1537 *** 
2 0.1081 *** 0.1319 *** 0.1653 *** 
3 0.0884 *** 0.0756 *** 0.1476 *** 
4 0.2012 *** 0.2248 *** 0.0964 *** 
5  0.0394 *** 0.0019 
6  0.0331 ** -0.0026 
7  0.0382 *** 0.0165 
8  0.04576 *** 0.0550 *** 
9  0.0343 *** 
10  0.0285 ** 
11  -0.0144 
12  0.01910 *** 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.083678 0.203536 0.230679 
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“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 2  Basic Regression Results for the Fundamental Equation Without Lagged 
Regressands (Various Lags) 
Equation being Difference between Growth Rates of House Prices versus Rent 
(Regressand) on Lagged Changes in 10-year Treasury and Local Rent Growth 
(MSA Fixed Effects Omitted)     
   Variables 8 Lags 12 Lags 16 Lags 
Nominal Interest 
   
Lag 1 0.1160 0.3084 0.6500 *** 
2 -0.0280 0.1308 0.1152 
3 -0.1680 0.1220 -0.0240 
4 -0.1560 0.4172 * -0.0160 
5 0.0460 0.3088 0.3340 
6 -0.6760 *** 0.0080 -0.2880 
7 0.2828 0.2140 -0.1800 
8 -0.9160 *** -0.4960 ** -1.2040  ***
9  -0.0440 -0.8600 *** 
10  -0.1840 -0.5680  ***
11  0.1128 -0.0680 
12  -0.1480 -0.3280 
13  -0.8880 *** 
14  -1.6320 ***
15  -0.3880 **
16  -0.8040 *** 
   
Rent Growth  
Lag 1 0.2185 *** 0.1618 *** 0.1778 *** 
2 0.2394 *** 0.1869 *** 0.2254 *** 
3 0.3369 *** 0.2290 *** 0.2588 *** 
4 0.3846 ***  0.2449 *** 0.1969 *** 
5 0.3836 *** 0.2773 *** 0.1888 *** 
6 0.4420 ***  0.3448 *** 0.2311 *** 
7 0.4378 *** 0.3439 *** 0.2623 *** 
8 0.0846 ***  -0.0071 0.0860 
9 -0.0681 0.0678 
10 -0.1065 ** 0.0731 
11 -0.0543 0.1531 *** 
12 0.0351 0.3122 *** 
13  0.3224 *** 
14  0.3574 *** 
15  0.3367 *** 
16  0.1046 *** 
  
Adjusted R-square 0.07351 0.079149 0.101218 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3 Comparison of Sum of Coefficients From Fundamental Equations, 
Equations (40) and (41).  
Coefficients are from Tables 1 and 2.   
 With Regressand on RHS Without Regressand on RHS 
Variables Lag = 4 Lag = 8 Lag = 12 Lag = 8 Lag = 12 Lag = 16 
Change in 
Interest Rate -0.6084 -2.4724 -1.6820 -1.4992 0.7500 -6.1488 
Change in 
Rent Growth -0.0886 2.2720 1.6186 2.5272 1.5876 3.3543 
Change in 
lagged LHS 0.2723 0.6145 0.7016 N/A N/A N/A 
LR effect of 
Change in 
Interest rate 
100bp 
-0.209 -1.606 
 
-1.409 
 
-0.373 0.1975 -1.5372 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.0837 0.2035 0.2307 0.0735 0.0791 0.1012 
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TTable 4 Comparison of Sums of Coefficients of the Error Equation from the 
Fundamental Equation  
Panel A: Fundamental Equation with Lagged Regressands 
 Fundamental Lag = 8         Fundamental Lag = 12 
Category Lag = 8 Lag = 12 Lag = 16 Lag = 8 Lag = 12 Lag = 16 
Non-Bubble MSA 
Pre-1999 
-0.3912  
(884.72) 
-0.3751  
(902.73) 
-0.2762  
(744.39) 
-0.4537  
(638.92) 
-0.4346  
(884.99) 
-0.5203  
(698.89) 
Non-Bubble MSA 
Post-1999 
0.1813 
(283.16) 
-0.2747  
(101.62) 
-0.0371  
(97.52) 
-0.1182  
(283.75) 
-0.2932  
(200.89) 
-0.0422  
(64.00) 
Differences 0.5725 0.1005  0.2391 0.3355 0.1414  0.4781 
Bubble MSA 
Pre-1999 
0.1140 
(348.46) 
0.0593  
(356.49) 
0.0677  
(298.91) 
0.0054  
(345.31) 
0.0313  
(379.78) 
-0.0221  
(431.35) 
Bubble MSA 
Post-1999 
0.4775 
(98.58) 
0.1356  
(65.21) 
0.0550  
(64.97) 
0.3376  
(140.37) 
0.0411  
(87.17) 
-0.1154  
(85.11) 
Difference 0.3661  0.0763 -0.0127 0.3322  0.0097  -0.0933  
Panel B: Fundamental Equation without Lagged Regressands 
 Fundamental Lag = 8         Fundamental Lag = 12 
Category Lag =8 Lag=12 Lag=16 Lag =8 Lag=12 Lag=16 
Non-Bubble MSA 
Pre-1999 
0.3573   
(796.63) 
0.3372   
(816.20) 
0.3272  
(651.50) 
0.2615 
(499.95) 
0.3384  
(681.97) 
0.3120  
(549.87) 
Non-Bubble MSA 
Post-1999 
0.6710  
(245.08) 
0.4270   
(79.96) 
0.7063  
(59.92) 
0.5976  
(243.33) 
0.6663  
(162.79)  
0.7259   
(35.87) 
Differences 0.3138   0.0898  0.3791  0.3360  0.3279   0.4139  
Bubble MSA 
Pre-1999 
0.5647  
(375.36)  
0.5157   
(382.91) 
0.4827  
(295.68)  
0.5498  
(256.06) 
0.5386  
(275.45)  
0.4722  
(317.88) 
Bubble MSA 
Post-1999 
0.8393  
(111.46)  
0.7453   
(72.78) 
0.6933   
(69.39) 
0.8399   
(112.74) 
0.7335  
(70.17)  
0.6935  
(67.00) 
Difference 0.2747   0.2296  0.2105  0.2901  0.1949 0.2213  
Note: Numbers within parentheses are the F-values for testing the hypothesis that the sum of the 
coefficients equals 1. All the above results indicate the null hypothesis is rejected, or the coefficients 
do not sum to unity. 
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Table 5 Test of Differences in Variance between the Pre- and Post-Bubble Period 
in the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs in Various Fundamental Equations 
Panel A: Comparing 8-lag versus 12-lag Fundamental Equations with Lagged Regressands  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 8-lag Fun- damental 
12-lag Fun-
damental GQ Test 
2 8-lag Fun- damental 
12-lag Fun- 
damental GQ Test 
2 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.64 × 10-4 1.51  × 10-4 1.1285 3.98 × 10-4 3.65 × 10-4 1.0262 
Post-1999 1.86 × 10-4 1.65  × 10-4 1.0802 2.72  × 10-4 2.29 × 10-4 1.0261 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 0.88406  0.91429   1.45973 * 1.59046 *  
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.48 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 1.0412 3.9479 × 10-4 3.2029 × 10-4 1.1282 
Post-1999 1.96  × 10-4 1.26 × 10-4 1.4083 * 2.366 × 10-44 2.07 × 10-4 1.0300 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 0.75616  1.14740   1.67166 * 1.54797 *  
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.43 × 10-4 1.41 × 10-4 1.0243 3.59 × 10-4 2.70 × 10-4 1.1536 
Post-1999 1.34 × 10-4 1.30 × 10-4 0.9810 2.67 × 10-4 2.41 × 10-4 0.9946 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.06339  1.09061   1.34328 * 1.12256   
Panel B: Comparing 8-lag versus 12-lag Fundamental Equations without Lagged Regressands  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 8-lag Fun- damental 
12-lag Fun-
damental GQ Test 
2 8-lag Fun- damental 
12-lag Fun- 
damental GQ Test 
2 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.76 × 10-4 1.56 × 10-4 1.1285 4.37 × 10-4 4.26 × 10-4 1.0262 
Post-1999 1.88 × 10-4 1.74 × 10-4 1.0802 3.30 × 10-4 3.22 × 10-4 1.0261 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 0.93295  0.89302   1.32176 * 1.32163 *  
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.54 × 10-4 1.48 × 10-4 1.0412 4.31 × 10-4 3.82 × 10-4 1.1282 
Post-1999 1.97 × 10-4 1.40 × 10-4 1.4083 * 2.89 × 10-44 2.81 × 10-4 1.0300 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 0.78288  1.05897  1.49222 * 1.36237 *  
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.48 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 1.0243 3.88 × 10-4 3.36 × 10-4 1.1536 
Post-1999 1.46 × 10-4 1.49 × 10-4 0.9810 2.96 × 10-4 2.97 × 10-4 0.9946 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.01278  0.96997   1.31219 * 1.13133   
Continue… 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
Panel C: Comparing 8-lag Fundamental Equations with and without Lagged Regressands  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 
With  
Regressands 
Without  
Regressands
GQ Test 2 
With  
Regressands
Without  
Regressands 
GQ Test 2 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.64 × 10-4 1.76 × 10-4 0.9345 3.98 × 10-4 4.37 × 10-4 0.9109 
Post-1999 1.86 × 10-4 1.88 × 10-4 0.9871 2.72 × 10-4 3.30 × 10-4 0.8234 
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.48 × 10-4 1.54 × 10-4 0.9595 3.95 × 10-4 4.31 × 10-4 0.9153 
Post-1999 1.96 × 10-4 1.97 × 10-4 0.9935 2.36 × 10-4 2.89 × 10-4 0.8164 
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.43 × 10-4 1.48 × 10-4 0.9667 3.59 × 10-4 3.88 × 10-4 0.9248 
Post-1999 1.34 × 10-4 1.46 × 10-4 0.9181 2.68 × 10-4 2.96 × 10-4 0.9042 
Panel D: Comparing 12-lag Fundamental Equations with and without Lagged Regressands  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 
With  
Regressands 
Without  
Regressands
GQ Test 
With  
Regressands
Without  
Regressands 
GQ Test 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.51 × 10-4 1.56 × 10-4 0.9706 3.65 × 10-4 4.26 × 10-4 0.8573 
Post-1999 1.65 × 10-4 1.74 × 10-4 0.9476 2.29 × 10-4 3.22 × 10-4 0.7125 
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.44 × 10-4 1.48 × 10-4 0.9734 3.20 × 10-4 3.82 × 10-4 0.8378 
Post-1999 1.26 × 10-4 1.40 × 10-4 0.8995 2.07 × 10-4 2.81 × 10-4 0.7376 
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.41 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 0.9763 2.70 × 10-4 3.36 × 10-4 0.8024 
Post-1999 1.30 × 10-4 1.49 × 10-4 0.8704 2.41 × 10-4 2.97 × 10-4 0.8099 
1. The “Pre/Post- 1999 Test” is test for statistical difference between the pre- and post-bubble periods 
(Goldfeld-Quandt Test is used).  
2. The “GQ Test” is test for statistical difference between two fundamental equations. 
* implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the 8-lag and 
12-lag fundamental equations are statistically the same at 5% significance level (compared to an F-value 
of 1.3) 
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Table 6 Test of Differences in Variance between Various Post-Bubble Periods in 
the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs in 8-Lag Fundamental Equations with 
4-Lag Error Equation 
 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Post-1999 variance 2.0000 × 10-4 2.5793 × 10-4 
Post-2002 variance 2.3126 × 10-4 2.6954 × 10-4 
Post-2003 variance 2.6627 × 10-4 3.0509 × 10-4 
GQ Test: 99 vs 02 0.8648 0.9569 
GQ Test: 99 vs 03 0.7511 0.8454 
GQ Test: 02 vs 03 0.86853 0.88346 
 
 
Table 7 Test of Differences in Variance between the Pre- and Post-Bubble Period 
in the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs in Fundamental Equations with 
Separation of Non-Bubble and Bubble MSAs 
 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Error 
Equation Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 
1 Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 1 
8-lag  1.72 × 10-4 1.38 × 10-4 1.2396  3.94 × 10-4 2.94 × 10-4 1.3395 *  
12-lag 1.55 × 10-4 1.44  × 10-4 1.0791  3.90 × 10-4 2.74 × 10-4 1.4236 * 
16-lag 1.51 × 10-4 1.48 × 10-4 1.0254  3.49 × 10-4 2.53 × 10-4 1.3755 * 
1. GQ Test compares the variances between the pre- and post-1999 period. 
* implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the 8-lag and 
12-lag fundamental equations are statistically the same at 5% significance level (compared to an F-value 
of 1.3) 
 
 
Table 8 Test of Differences in Variance between the Pre- and Post-Bubble Period 
in the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs in Fundamental Equations with 
Local Inflation in the Fundamental 
 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Error 
Equation Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 
1 Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 1 
8-lag  1.57 × 10-4 1.18  × 10-4 1.33123 * 3.90 × 10-4 3.30 × 10-4 1.18236  
12-lag 1.50 × 10-4 1.25  × 10-4 1.20338  3.88 × 10-4 2.94 × 10-4 1.31859 * 
16-lag 1.46 × 10-4 1.30 × 10-4 1.11997  3.48 × 10-4 2.72 × 10-4 1.27802  
1. GQ Test compares the variances between the pre- and post-1999 period. 
* implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the 8-lag and 
12-lag fundamental equations are statistically the same at 5% significance level (compared to an F-value 
of 1.3) 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Annualized Average Growth Rates (in percentage) of Price, Rent, 
Difference between Price and Rent, and Local CPI of Individual MSAs  
(Asterisk indicates MSAs separated as bubble candidates) 
 
MSAs 
No. of 
Obs. 
Price 
Growth 
Rent 
Growth 
Price-Rent 
Growth 
Local 
CPI 
Akron, OH  103 3.9768 3.5016 0.4752 3.7448 
Anchorage, AK*  96 3.1673 2.5849 0.5824 2.4593 
Ann Arbor, MI  102 5.1890 3.4639 1.7251 3.5542 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, 
GA  
104 4.6340 3.8777 0.7563 7.1204 
Atlantic City, NJ  87 6.5720 3.7304 2.8416 3.2089 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  36 9.2178 4.1863 5.0315 2.5386 
Boston-Quincy, MA *   104 8.2892 4.9242 3.3650 4.0825 
Boulder, CO  104 5.8883 3.7984 2.0899 3.7073 
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA  103 5.4960 3.4012 2.0948 3.6060 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL  104 5.4657 4.3685 1.0972 3.6755 
Cincinnati-Middletown, 
OH-KY-IN  
104 3.8449 3.3949 0.4501 3.4088 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  104 3.9130 3.5016 0.4114 3.7448 
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX  104 3.0029 3.3065 -0.3036 3.5913 
Denver-Aurora, CO  104 4.9855 3.7984 1.1872 3.7073 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI  104 4.7089 3.3968 1.3120 3.4888 
Flint, MI  104 4.6088 3.3968 1.2120 3.4888 
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano 
Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL * 
104 6.4542 3.9566 2.4976 3.8114 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  104 2.7439 3.3065 -0.5626 3.5913 
Gary, IN  104 3.7292 4.3685 -0.6393 3.6755 
Greeley, CO  81 4.6503 2.9757 1.6746 2.8996 
Honolulu, HI * 104 8.4394 4.0158 4.4236 3.6627 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  104 2.4987 3.1129 -0.6142 3.2148 
Kansas City, MO-KS  104 3.6772 3.6694 0.0078 3.3558 
Lake County-Kenosha County, 
IL-WI  
104 5.1801 4.3685 0.8116 3.6755 
Los Angeles-Long 
*Beach-Glendale, CA  
104 7.2382 4.7031 2.5351 3.7761 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL*  104 6.5227 3.9566 2.5661 3.8114 
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 (Appendix 1  continued…) 
 
MSAs 
No. of 
Obs. 
Price 
Growth 
Rent 
Growth 
Price-Rent 
Growth 
Local 
CPI 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, 
WI  
104 4.6754 3.6459 1.0295 3.5204 
Minneapolis-St. 
Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  
104 5.2949 3.6892 1.6058 3.7092 
New York-White Plains-Wayne, 
NY-NJ * 
104 7.9851 4.6493 3.3358 3.9667 
Philadelphia, PA  104 6.3239 4.3361 1.9878 3.7826 
Pittsburgh, PA  104 3.8733 3.2084 0.6649 3.6355 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, 
OR-WA * 
104 5.5337 3.3116 2.2221 3.4013 
Racine, WI  90 5.0893 3.0796 2.0097 2.7917 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, 
CA * 
104 6.3798 4.7031 1.6767 3.7761 
Salem, OR  98 5.1685 3.5155 1.6530 3.6083 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, 
CA * 
104 7.0325 4.8219 2.2106 4.2708 
San Francisco - San Mateo - 
Redwood City, CA * 
104 7.7118 5.0223 2.6895 3.8847 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, 
CA * 
104 7.9135 5.0223 2.8912 3.8847 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA * 104 6.2482 3.7498 2.4983 3.8443 
Tacoma, WA * 104 5.9906 3.7498 2.2407 3.8443 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL * 
32 11.0700 4.3738 6.6962 3.7665 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV* 
36 10.8923 4.1863 6.7061 2.5386 
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ  103 6.1454 4.3271 1.8182 3.6888 
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Appendix 2 Results of Error Equations from Fundamental Equation with 8-Lag 
Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- and 
Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0012 *** 0.0024 *** -0.0024 *** 0.0043 *** 
1 -0.0689 ** 0.1654 *** 0.1722 *** 0.3480 *** 
2 -0.1032 *** -0.1405 *** 0.0614 ** -0.0176 
3 0.0918 *** 0.0553 0.1181 *** 0.4030  *** 
4 -0.0144 -0.1233 *** -0.1325 *** -0.2591 *** 
5 -0.0881*** -0.0114 -0.1060 *** -0.0831 
6 -0.0535 ** 0.0328 0.0107 0.0343 
7 -0.0705 *** -0.0798 * 0.0796 *** -0.0786 
8 -0.0844 *** 0.2829 *** -0.0920 *** 0.1306 ** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0526 0.1297 0.0913 0.2537 
Durbin-Watson  1.938 1.801 1.979 1.998 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0009 ** 0.0034 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0078 *** 
1 -0.0429 0.3202 *** 0.2001 *** 0.2555 *** 
2 -0.0910 *** -0.2622 *** 0.0872 *** -0.1513 *** 
3 0.0798 *** 0.1869 *** 0.0680 ** 0.4616 *** 
4 -0.0161 -0.1998 *** -0.1141 *** -0.3444 *** 
5 -0.0651 ** -0.0608 -0.1500 *** -0.0200 
6 -0.0148 -0.0118 0.0539 * 0.0850 
7 -0.0427 -0.1642 *** 0.0745 *** 0.0279 
8 -0.1360 *** 0.3332 *** -0.1222 *** 0.0204 
9 0.0142 -0.3454 *** 0.0540 ** 0.0459 
10 -0.0146 0.0991 0.0221 -0.0056 
11 -0.0234 -0.2324 *** -0.0441 * -0.1428 ** 
12 -0.0226 0.0624 -0.0701 *** -0.0965 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0485 0.2119 0.1234 0.271 
Durbin-Watson  1.960 1.931 1.989 2.05 
Continue… 
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(Appendix 2 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0008 ** 0.0037 *** -0.0024 *** 0.0098 *** 
1 0.0085 0.2554 *** 0.2983 *** 0.1807 *** 
2 -0.0940 *** -0.2357 *** 0.0586 * -0.1659 ** 
3 0.0977 *** 0.1932 *** 0.0728 ** 0.5416 *** 
4 -0.0287 -0.2203 *** -0.1408 *** -0.4077 *** 
5 -0.0435 0.1398 ** -0.1351 *** 0.0075 
6 -0.0249 0.0216 0.0642 ** -0.0191 
7 -0.0395 -0.0684 0.0575 * 0.2096 ** 
8 -0.1643 *** -0.1333 ** -0.1717 *** -0.0494 
9 0.0323 -0.1209 * 0.1211 *** 0.0100 
10 -0.0193 0.0560 0.0004 -0.0143 
11 -0.0097 -0.1708 *** -0.0536 ** -0.1258 
12 0.0252 0.1336 ** -0.0704 *** -0.1899 ** 
13 0.0155 -0.0772 0.0180 0.0239 
14 -0.0060 0.0502 -0.0037 0.0823 
15 -0.0108 -0.0138 -0.0132 -0.0349 
16 -0.0149 0.1534 ** -0.0348 0.0063 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0565 0.1766 0.1959 0.3072 
Durbin-Watson  1.965 1.892 1.927 2.086 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 3  Results of Error Equations from Fundamental Equation with 
12-Lag Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- 
and Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0012 *** -0.0021 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0044 *** 
1 -0.0689 ** 0.0809 ** 0.1077 *** 0.2113 *** 
2 -0.1032 *** 0.0700 *** -0.2137 ** -0.0267 
3 0.0918 *** 0.0000 0.0151 0.3144 *** 
4 -0.0144 -0.0197 -0.0748 -0.1263 ** 
5 -0.0881*** -0.1535 -0.0731 *** -0.0999 * 
6 -0.0535 ** 0.0590 0.0141 ** 0.0527 
7 -0.0705 *** 0.0816 *** -0.1310 *** -0.1013 
8 -0.0844 *** -0.1127 *** 0.2376 *** 0.1135 * 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0543 0.1002 0.0542 0.1304 
Durbin-Watson  1.968 1.954 1.989 2.001 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0009 ** 0.0026 *** -0.0021 *** 0.0081 *** 
1 -0.0767 ** 0.1707 *** 0.1782 *** 0.1124 *** 
2 -0.1100 *** -0.2418 *** 0.0549 * -0.1733 *** 
3 0.0187 0.0938 * 0.0016 0.3327 *** 
4 0.0198 -0.1221 ** -0.0339 -0.2205 *** 
5 -0.0223 0.0261 -0.1384 *** -0.0687 
6 -0.0317 0.0830 * 0.0648 ** 0.1342 ** 
7 -0.0337 -0.0999 ** 0.0590 ** 0.0148 
8 -0.1948 *** -0.1366 ** -0.1538 *** 0.0376 
9 -0.0024 -0.1132 * 0.0901 *** 0.0593 
10 -0.0667 ** -0.0220 0.0000 -0.0090 
11 -0.0040 -0.0601 -0.0473 * -0.0705 
12 0.0693 *** 0.1289 ** -0.0439 * -0.1080 * 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0648  0.1406  0.0983  0.1078  
Durbin-Watson  1.9650  1.8040  1.9380  2.0660  
Continue… 
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(Appendix 3 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0013 *** 0.0029 ***  -0.0022 ***  0.0097 *** 
1 -0.0581 * 0.2730 *** 0.1449 ***  0.0532 
2 -0.1234 *** -0.3271 *** 0.0316  -0.2007 *** 
3 0.0201 0.2929 *** 0.0495  0.4080 *** 
4 0.0037 -0.1658 ** -0.0466  -0.2747 *** 
5 -0.0340 0.1065 * -0.0558 *  -0.0334 
6 -0.0275 -0.0039 0.0307  0.0318 
7 -0.0416 -0.0945 * 0.0585 **  0.1630* 
8 -0.1852 *** -0.2334 *** -0.1732 ***  -0.0077 
9 0.0182 0.0028 0.0691 *  0.0034 
10 -0.0680 ** -0.2459 *** -0.0057  -0.0235 
11 -0.0156 0.2023 ** -0.0085  -0.0818 
12 0.0652 ** 0.1475 * -0.0378  -0.1742 ** 
13 -0.0206 -0.0242 -0.0170  0.0311 
14 -0.0355 0.0682 -0.0182  0.0299 
15 -0.0263 -0.0734 -0.0251  -0.0579 
16 0.0080 0.0327 -0.0185  0.0182 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0618  0.2563  0.0765  0.2181  
Durbin-Watson  2.0280  2.0210  1.8920  2.0640  
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 4  Results of Error Equations from 8-Lag Fundamental Equation 
without Lagged Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in 
Pre- and Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0007 * 0.0031 *** -0.0019 *** 0.0049 *** 
1 0.0343 0.2425 *** 0.2074 *** 0.3658 *** 
2 0.0450 * -0.0481 0.1810 *** 0.1047 ** 
3 0.2028 *** 0.1219 *** 0.1593 *** 0.4155 *** 
4 0.1585 *** -0.0309 0.0431 -0.0792 
5 -0.0355 0.0365 -0.1169 *** -0.1608 *** 
6 -0.0017 0.0798 * 0.0395 0.0956 
7 -0.0311 -0.0355 0.0783 *** -0.1040 
8 -0.0151 0.3049 *** -0.0270 0.2016 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0755 0.1568 0.1769 0.8442  
Durbin-Watson  1.9480 1.8170 1.9880 2.0160 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept 0.0002 0.0042 *** -0.0018 *** 0.0083 *** 
1 0.0527 * 0.3902  *** 0.2325  *** 0.2773 *** 
2 0.0167 -0.1589 *** 0.2010 *** -0.0300 *** 
3 0.1871 *** 0.2422 *** 0.1061  *** 0.4919 
4 0.1348 *** -0.0936 0.0572 * -0.1328 *** 
5 -0.0125 0.0020 -0.1670 *** -0.0723 ** 
6 0.0141 0.0470 0.0830 *** 0.1894 
7 0.0036 -0.0936 ** 0.1056 *** -0.0020 *** 
8 -0.0992 *** 0.3611 *** -0.0711 ** 0.0905 
9 0.0372 -0.2805 *** 0.0421 0.0958 
10 -0.0118 0.0905 0.0254 -0.0035 
11 -0.0070 -0.1453 ** -0.0651 *** -0.1391 * 
12 0.0214 0.0658 -0.0341 -0.0200 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0773  0.2056  0.2068  0.4098  
Durbin-Watson  1.9730  1.9500  1.9950  2.0370 
Continue… 
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(Appendix 4 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0002 0.0039 *** -0.0020 *** 0.0104 *** 
1 0.0941 *** 0.3514 *** 0.3270  *** 0.2151  *** 
2 0.0181 -0.1253  ** 0.1636 *** -0.0299 
3 0.1925  *** 0.2614 *** 0.0974  *** 0.5820 *** 
4 0.1095 *** -0.1086 * 0.0271 -0.2049  ** 
5 -0.0011 0.1652 *** -0.1621 *** -0.0420 
6 -0.0039 0.0924 0.0931  *** 0.0833 
7 0.0056 -0.0115 0.0893 *** 0.1529 
8 -0.1316 *** -0.1397  ** -0.1179  *** 0.0262 
9 0.0455 * -0.0328 0.1217 *** 0.0486 
10 -0.0113 0.0772 0.0153 -0.0120 
11 0.0177 -0.0739 -0.0678  ** -0.1618 * 
12 0.0671 *** 0.1520 ** -0.0292 -0.1217 
13 0.0123 0.0244 -0.0108 0.0668 
14 -0.0392 * 0.0358 -0.0219 0.1100 
15 -0.0334 * -0.0137 -0.0187 -0.0598 
16 -0.0147 0.0520 -0.0234 0.0407 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0835  0.2242  0.2682  0.3758 
Durbin-Watson  1.9670  1.8140  1.9270  2.0660  
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 5  Results of Error Equations from 12-Lag Fundamental Equation 
without Lagged Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in 
Pre- and Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0007 * 0.0032 *** -0.0018 *** 0.0050 *** 
1 0.0318 0.2374 *** 0.2191 *** 0.3548 *** 
2 0.0428 -0.1029 ** 0.2125 *** 0.0895 * 
3 0.1656 *** 0.1405 *** 0.1023 *** 0.4213 *** 
4 0.1322 *** 0.0174 0.0478 -0.1036 * 
5 0.0102 0.0009 -0.1531 *** -0.1253 ** 
6 0.0054 0.0827 * 0.0879 *** 0.0891 
7 -0.0111 -0.0844 * 0.1102 *** -0.0861 
8 -0.1154 *** 0.3060 *** -0.0770 *** 0.2002 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0681  0.1398  0.1917  0.3818  
Durbin-Watson  1.9610  1.9360  1.9890  2.0230  
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept 0.0004 0.0029 *** -0.0019 *** 0.0087 *** 
1 0.0730 ** 0.3120 *** 0.3131 *** 0.2458 *** 
2 0.0374 -0.1369 *** 0.1779 *** -0.0325 
3 0.1546 *** 0.2396 *** 0.0942 *** 0.4762 *** 
4 0.1128  *** -0.0310 0.0285 -0.1487 ** 
5 0.0226 0.1211 *** -0.1387 *** -0.0573 
6 -0.0115 0.1693 *** 0.0830 *** 0.1941 *** 
7 0.0025 -0.0441 0.0817 *** 0.0351 
8 -0.1518 *** -0.0939 -0.1144 *** 0.0934 
9 0.0365 -0.0536 0.1149 *** 0.1071 
10 -0.0425 * 0.0464 0.0116 0.0004 
11 0.0117 -0.0391 -0.0745 *** -0.1257 * 
12 0.0933 *** 0.1765 *** -0.0388 -0.0544 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0763  0.2080  0.2500  0.3873  
Durbin-Watson  1.9600  1.7940  1.9440  2.0510  
Continue… 
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(Appendix 5 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.0010 *** 0.0030 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0101 *** 
1 0.0811 ** 0.4261 *** 0.2726 *** 0.2042 *** 
2 0.0196 -0.2487 *** 0.1528 *** -0.0340 
3 0.1577 *** 0.4521 *** 0.1462 *** 0.5749 *** 
4 0.1045 *** -0.1279 * 0.0153 -0.2185 ** 
5 0.0220 0.1936 *** -0.0531 * -0.0328 
6 0.0124 0.0460 0.0415 0.0748 
7 0.0081 -0.0423 0.0747 ** 0.1904 * 
8 -0.1315 *** -0.2062 *** -0.1405 *** 0.0434 
9 0.0655 ** 0.0915 0.0997 *** 0.0617 
10 -0.0402 -0.1917 ** 0.0176 -0.0123 
11 0.0149 0.2548 *** -0.0102 -0.1401 
12 0.1014 *** 0.1881 ** -0.0190 -0.1173 
13 -0.0257 -0.0472 -0.0388 0.0429 
14 -0.0477 * 0.0687 -0.0295 0.0707 
15 -0.0410 -0.1115 * -0.0397 -0.0524 
16 0.0109 -0.0195 -0.0175 0.0379 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0815  0.3360  0.2703  0.3564  
Durbin-Watson  2.0330  1.9890  1.9020  2.0510  
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 6  Results of the Fundamental Equation without Lagged Regressands 
with 20 and 24 lags 
Equation being Difference between Growth Rates of House Prices versus Rent 
(Regressand) on Lagged Changes in 10-year Treasury, Local Rent Growth, and 
Regressands (MSA Fixed Effects Omitted)    
 
 Panel A: Regression Results of Various Lags in Fundamental Equation 
 
Fundamental with 
20 Lags 
Fundamental with 
24 Lags 
Lag Δ Interest Rate Δ Rent Growth Δ Interest Rate Δ Rent Growth 
1 0.0021*** 0.1924*** 0.0024 *** 0.1965*** 
2 0.0003 0.2314*** 0.0004 0.2440*** 
3 -0.0003 0.2508*** 0.0006 0.2659*** 
4 0.0013** 0.1881*** 0.0019*** 0.2101*** 
5 0.0015** 0.1832*** 0.0025*** 0.2024*** 
6 -0.0007 0.2225*** 0.0001 0.2340*** 
7 -0.0022*** 0.2393*** -0.0018*** 0.2459*** 
8 -0.0031*** 0.0446 -0.0029*** 0.0438 
9 -0.0021*** 0.0215 -0.0017*** 0.0102 
10 -0.0016*** 0.0240 -0.0017*** 0.0015 
11 -0.0005 0.1021* -0.0006 0.0697 
12 -0.0014** 0.2595*** -0.0005 0.2174*** 
13 -0.0025*** 0.2697*** -0.0020*** 0.2150*** 
14 -0.0040*** 0.3005*** -0.0028*** 0.2327*** 
15 0.0002 0.2826*** 0.0012** 0.2009*** 
16 -0.0017*** 0.0597* -0.0002 -0.0362 
17 -0.0020*** -0.0452*** -0.0004 -0.1477*** 
18 -0.0015*** -0.0545*** -0.0003 -0.1502*** 
19 0.0001 -0.0301*** 0.0010* -0.1174*** 
20 0.0012** -0.0086 0.0014*** -0.0871*** 
21   0.0025*** -0.0644*** 
22   0.0017*** -0.0419*** 
23   0.0012** -0.0122 
24   0.0018*** -0.0044 
Sum of 
Coefficients -0.0168 2.7333 0.0037 1.9287 
Adjusted R2  0.1375 0.1562 
Continue… 
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(Appendix 6 continued…) 
Panel B: Results of Error Equations  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Panel B1: Fundamental with 20 Lags 
Intercept -0.0008** 0.0026*** -0.0022*** 0.0085***
1 0.1107*** 0.3265*** 0.3067*** 0.3105***
2 0.1309*** -0.1879*** 0.1255*** -0.0940
3 0.1542*** 0.3840*** 0.1881*** 0.5167***
4 0.0733** -0.0061 -0.0251 -0.2220***
5 0.0043 0.1605*** -0.0428 -0.0488
6 0.0296 0.2147*** 0.0048 0.1213
7 0.0368 -0.0706 0.0887*** 0.1202
8 -0.0277 -0.0421 -0.1209*** 0.2004**
9 0.1067*** -0.0805 0.0860*** -0.0503
10 0.0044 -0.0559 0.0287 0.0419
11 0.0369 0.0879 -0.0587* -0.1338
12 0.0510** 0.1403** -0.0361 0.0518
Sum of Coefficients 0.7110  0.8708  0.5450  0.8139  
Adjusted R-Square 0.1596 0.3301 0.2785  0.3778  
Panel B2: Fundamental with 24 Lags 
Intercept -0.0007* 0.00222*** -0.0019*** 0.00867***
1 0.11198*** 0.33985*** 0.30737*** 0.31032***
2 0.12311*** -0.17152*** 0.12255*** -0.09848
3 0.16115*** 0.36297*** 0.1947*** 0.46476***
4 0.10019*** -0.02897 -0.02394 -0.226***
5 0.01296 0.12749** -0.03269 -0.05374
6 0.0372 0.2049*** 0.01237 0.13831
7 0.04401 -0.05844 0.09574*** 0.14496*
8 -0.02887 -0.02371 -0.1131*** 0.19723**
9 0.07893*** -0.07452 0.08044** -0.06921
10 -0.01151 -0.03787 0.02079 0.05717
11 0.04475* 0.10242* -0.0606* -0.10647
12 0.06251** 0.12759** -0.03152 0.05444
Sum of Coefficients 0.7364  0.8702  0.5722  0.8133  
Adjusted R-Square 0.1828  0.3187  0.2916  0.3561 
Continue… 
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(Appendix 6 continued…) 
Panel C: Test pf Differences in Variance between Pre- and Post-Bubble Period  
Category Fundamental = 20 Lags Fundamental = 24 Lags 
Non-Bubble MSA Pre-1999 1.66 × 10-4 1.70 × 10-4 
Non-Bubble MSA Post-1999 1.68 × 10-4 1.62 × 10-4 
Pre/Post- 1999 Test 1 0.99123 1.05245 
Bubble MSA Pre-1999 3.39 × 10-4 3.39 × 10-4 
Bubble MSA Post-1999 2.60 × 10-4 2.43 × 10-4 
Pre/Post- 1999 Test 1 1.30188 1.39361 † 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
1. The “Pre/Post- 1999 Test” is test for statistical difference between the pre- and post-bubble periods 
(Goldfeld-Quandt Test is used).  
†  implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the pre- and 
post-1999 periods are statistically the same at 5% significance level (compared to an F-value of 1.3). 
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Appendix 7  Regression Results for the Fundamental Equation for Bubble MSAs 
and Non-Bubble MSAs Separated 
Equation being Difference between Growth Rates of House Prices versus Rent 
(Regressand) on Lagged Changes in 10-year Treasury, Local Rent Growth, 
and Regressands (MSA Fixed Effects Omitted)     
  Variables  
   Variables Nominal Interests Rent Growth  Regressand 
Panel A: Non-Bubble MSAs 
L 1
-0.65200 ** 0.08545 * -0.21947 *** 
2
-0.85200 *** 0.13290 * 0.13028 *** 
3
-1.02000 *** 0.10380 0.00696 
4
-0.66000 *** 0.17795 ** 0.22104 *** 
5
-0.25600 0.10759 0.10375 *** 
6
-1.00400  *** 0.14199 * 0.07580 *** 
7
0.31960 0.22916 *** 0.13573 *** 
8
-0.61600 ** 0.11281 ** 0.10386 *** 
   
Adjusted
0.25247    
   
Panel B: Bubble MSAs 
L 1
0.28320 0.09866 ** 0.11390 *** 
2
-0.34800 0.16700 *** 0.13044 *** 
3
0.07520 0.28606 *** 0.11596 *** 
4
0.26560 0.49461 *** 0.21936 *** 
5
-0.01200 0.44867 *** 0.02737 
6
-0.42000 0.48665 *** 0.01126 
7
-0.12400 0.44597 *** 0.01143 
8
-0.96000 *** -0.00880 0.02318 
    
Adj t d
0.22687    
   
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 8 Results of Error Equations from 8-Lag Fundamental Equation with 
Separation of Non-Bubble and Bubble MSAs in Pre- and Post-Bubble 
Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept 0.00099 *** -0.00254 *** 0.00184 *** 0.00447 *** 
1 0.13516 *** 0.07516 ** 0.53786 *** 0.18425 *** 
2 -0.12286 *** 0.07666 *** -0.39784 *** 0.02370 
3 0.17815 *** 0.07047 ** 0.44936 *** 0.21641 *** 
4 -0.05435 ** -0.12580 *** -0.26742 *** -0.14515 *** 
5 -0.06125 ** -0.13983 *** 0.09191 -0.09551 ** 
6 -0.05020 ** 0.01288 -0.02054 0.03616 
7 -0.08117 *** 0.08362 *** -0.09178 -0.09629 * 
8 -0.04564 ** -0.09072 *** -0.04692 0.31113 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0793 0.0664 0.2574 0.1591 
Durbin-Watson  1.938 1.991 2.016 1.873 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept 0.00080 ** -0.00226 *** 0.00279 ***  0.00790 *** 
1 0.16613 *** 0.09914 *** 0.56779 ***  0.12394 ** 
2 -0.09202 *** 0.11065 *** -0.48747 ***  -0.10439 ** 
3 0.15724 *** 0.02502 0.52716 ***  0.33279 *** 
4 -0.05860 ** -0.10885 *** -0.33241 ***  -0.21416 *** 
5 -0.05823 ** -0.17418 *** 0.16204 **  -0.10847 ** 
6 -0.01653 0.05036 * 0.01328  0.01600 
7 -0.07130 *** 0.08571 *** -0.12262 *  -0.06672 
8 -0.06464 ** -0.12261 *** -0.06870  0.30957 ***
9 0.02814 0.04245 -0.05150  -0.11414 * 
10 0.00740 0.03863 -0.13741 *  0.04662 
11 -0.02684 -0.04562 * 0.04492  -0.24365 *** 
12 -0.01764 -0.05812 ** 0.04615  -0.05493 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0706 0.098 0.3345 0.2134 
Durbin-Watson  1.953 1.986 1.974 2.070 
Continue… 
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(Appendix 8 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept 0.00065 * -0.00236 *** 0.00279 *** 0.00984 *** 
1 0.21999 *** 0.19803 *** 0.54898 *** 0.03237 
2 -0.10882 *** 0.09135 *** -0.48642 *** -0.12456 ** 
3 0.17832 *** 0.02455 0.54877 *** 0.32870 *** 
4 -0.08917 *** -0.13469 *** -0.39248 *** -0.21646 *** 
5 -0.03099 -0.15524 *** 0.27316 *** -0.07251 
6 -0.02698 0.06678 ** -0.04320 0.08423 
7 -0.07308 ** 0.06640 ** -0.06925 0.04278 
8 -0.08411 *** -0.18035 *** -0.10524 0.03212 
9 0.04548 0.11070 *** -0.01847 -0.00945 
10 0.00160 0.02223 -0.16214 * 0.04346 
11 -0.01198 -0.06224 ** 0.04352 -0.27765 *** 
12 0.01884 -0.06946 *** 0.12789 -0.08889 
13 0.00486 0.01393 -0.19258 ** 0.05007 
14 -0.01384 0.00817 0.18351 ** 0.01049 
15 -0.02011 -0.01089 -0.10143 -0.09360 
16 0.00288 -0.03854 * 0.25325 *** 0.04688 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0942 0.1589 0.3568 0.2110 
Durbin-Watson  1.963 1.937 2.031 2.004 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 9 Results of Error Equations from 8-Lag Fundamental Equation with 
Local Inflation in the Fundamental (various lags) 
 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.00163 *** 0.00163 *** -0.00254 *** 0.00450 *** 
1 -0.05126 * 0.35149 *** 0.17341 *** 0.30734 *** 
2 -0.11513 *** -0.31355 *** 0.06033 *** -0.02939 
3 0.05640 ** 0.32261 *** 0.08594 *** 0.22792 *** 
4 -0.06002 ** -0.18798 *** -0.13008 *** -0.18111 *** 
5 -0.07794 *** 0.08235 -0.12294 *** -0.03666 
6 -0.05090  ** 0.02983 0.03482 0.01674 
7 -0.04720 ** -0.04057 0.07411 *** -0.10121 * 
8 -0.09052  *** -0.06091 -0.08169 *** 0.34916 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0446 0.0854 0.1917  0.2266 
Durbin-Watson  1.9800 1.963 1.9890  1.951 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.00139 *** 0.00256 *** -0.00242 *** 0.00841 *** 
1 -0.03334 0.38500 *** 0.19820  *** 0.19789 *** 
2 -0.08873 *** -0.37852 *** 0.08625 *** -0.15115 *** 
3 0.04873 * 0.36500 *** 0.03407 0.36611 *** 
4 -0.04623 -0.25366 *** -0.11899  *** -0.24821 *** 
5 -0.06947 ** 0.13173 ** -0.14020 *** -0.03452 
6 -0.01402 0.03573 0.06468 ** 0.00068 
7 -0.05271 ** -0.01728 ** 0.05410 * -0.06351 
8 -0.11545 *** -0.15394 -0.11180 *** 0.36649 *** 
9 0.01773 0.10067 0.05457 * -0.12022 * 
10 -0.00812 -0.17881 ** 0.02794 0.06897 
11 -0.03055 0.08946 -0.04311 -0.27996 *** 
12 -0.01969 0.00766 -0.07415 *** -0.00499 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0356  0.1122  0.2062  0.2496  
Durbin-Watson  1.9940  1.9940  1.9520  2.0880  
Continue… 
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(Appendix 9 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Number of Lags Pre-bubble Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Pre-bubble 
Period 
Post-bubble 
Period 
Intercept -0.00135 *** 0.00287 *** -0.00272 *** 0.01004 *** 
1 0.01409 0.35994 *** 0.31673 *** 0.13401 ** 
2 -0.09413 *** -0.34498 *** -0.01439 -0.15430 ** 
3 0.07158 ** 0.35902 *** 0.07945 *** 0.35390 *** 
4 -0.07171 ** -0.28205 *** -0.14695 *** -0.25443 *** 
5 -0.05146 * 0.18385 ** -0.11819 *** -0.00621 
6 -0.02238 0.00128 0.07680 ** 0.09674 
7 -0.04575 0.00041 0.04431 0.01795 
8 -0.14399 *** -0.20864 *** -0.15929 *** 0.03153 
9 0.05920 ** 0.14061 0.10566 *** 0.14057 
10 -0.03514 -0.25528 *** -0.00720 -0.00722 
11 -0.02240 0.10516 -0.03656 -0.31179 *** 
12 -0.00498 0.00303 -0.06739 ** -0.01240 
13 -0.00623 -0.10628 0.00562 0.02602 
14 0.00366 0.04570 0.00054 -0.03296 
15 -0.00429 -0.01619 -0.02032 -0.08671 
16 0.01174 0.10674 -0.03923 0.06824 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0469   0.2018  0.1824  0.2507  
Durbin-Watson  1.9910  2.0060  1.9940  2.0350  
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
